Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Since the time of the 1998 crisis the presence of the government as majority owner of commercial banks in Russia has increased steadily. By the end of 2008 the combined market share of state-controlled banks surpassed one-half of the country's total banking assets, sending into a decline genuine commercial banking based on private initiative. Was it a short-term effect of the financial crisis of 2008 or a natural systemic choice for essentially a non-market redistributive economy (Kirdina, 2004) ? The question remains valid regardless of the recently-declared intention of the Russian government to start withdrawing from some of the core entities in industry and financial sector.
Government banking attracts the attention of academics. In a seminal and influential paper on political economy of government banking La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) reviewed the causes and consequences of direct state ownership of banks, especially in developing countries. A number of empirical studies have been devoted to comparative efficiency and competitiveness of state-controlled banks vis-à-vis other groups of banking market participants, namely domestic private and foreignowned banks (Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2000; Bonin, Hasan, Wachtel, 2005; Fries, Neven, Seabright, Taci, 2006; Fungáčová, Poghosyan, 2009; Anzoátegui, Martínez Pería, Melecky, 2010; Fungáčová, Solanko, Weill, 2010; Karas, Schoors, Weill, 2010) . We also observe a renewed interest in re-testing by recent empirical data the macroeconomic effects of government ownership of banks. Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland (2009) and Körner and Schnabel (2010) challenge the belief that the impact of government banking on financial development and economic growth in developing countries is homogeneous and negative (La Porta et al., 2002) ; they argue that the impact is actually heterogeneous depending on the quality of local institutions, starting level of development and other parameters, and can be neutral or even positive.
This paper revisits government ownership of banks in Russia by offering an alternative estimate of the share of public sector in the banking industry and discussing some of its special features, such as corporate pyramids and replacement of direct government ownership by less transparent schemes of indirect ownership and control. We also try to contribute to the interpretation of empirical results concerning state-owned banks' comparative efficiency and market position.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 assesses the magnitude of public sector in the Russian banking industry. Section 3 describes the replacement of direct government ownership by indirect ownership and control. Section 4 interprets the results of empirical studies on comparative performance of state-owned banks. Section 5 discusses cyclicality of state engagement and disengagement from the banking industry. Section 6 concludes. 
Scope of Public Sector in Russian Banking
In order to build a sample of state-controlled banks we screened individual firms for presence of public sector institutions among their shareholders. Information sources included statutory disclosure by banks and their parent companies, annual and quarterly reports, Central Bank of Russia (CBR) publications and website. Bank-level statistical data were borrowed from Interfax quarterly database of Russian banks (Interfax, 2010) , Rozbizneskonsalting rankings (RBK, March 2011) and bank web-sites. Official sources do not break down companies by form of property in a way acceptable from a substantive viewpoint (Sprenger, 2010, p.68) . Absence of governmental authorities among shareholders of record is sufficient legal ground to regard such a bank as nominally private. Analytical reports of the CBR do not specify which exactly institutions comprise 'state-controlled banks'. The legal status of bank equity stakes belonging to state-owned enterprises and banks is more blurred yet. All attributions with respect to form of ownership at individual banks were thus made by the author along with the principle of economic substance over legal form (funds of public origin should constitute at least one-half of bank's equity 1 ).
We distinguish two types of state-controlled banks 2 . In a directly-controlled institution government authorities at federal or sub-federal level directly own a controlling stake of shares. In an indirectly-controlled bank a controlling stake belongs to companies and banks whose equity is formed with public funds. State-controlled banks are listed in According to our calculation, by the end of 2010 combined assets of state-controlled banks4 grew to RUB 18.2 trillion. Their aggregate market share reached its peak of 54.7 percent in 2009 before slightly contracting to 53.7 percent by the end of 2010, as depicted on Fig.1 with a breakdown between types of banks5. The above estimates appear on the high side as compared to the an official central bank report that put statecontrolled banks' share of total bank assets at 45.8 percent by the beginning of 2011 (CBR, 2011, p.21) . That was in between our figures of 41.3 percent referring to narrowly-defined state property (federal, regional and municipal authorities) and 53.7 percent in the broad definition (including banks indirectly owned and controlled by the state). We thus attribute the discrepancy to different coverage of the latter category. 6
State-controlled banks are now active in all or most of the market segments, and not only in collecting household deposits. At the end of 2009 they held 63 percent of the total corporate loans portfolio and 52 percent of bank loans to private individuals (Fig.2) .
4 Assets of banks where state participation exceeds 50 percent are counted fully.
5 Policy lenders without a banking license are left beyond the scope of analysis in this paper because banking statistics does not capture their lending operations. The figure on market share of statecontrolled banks does not include the commercial loans portfolio (mainly corporate lending and preexport finance) of Vneshekonombank itself, although we do include the figures of its subsidiaries, Svyaz-Bank and Globex-Bank. We estimate that on a consolidated basis the commercial loans portfolio of Vneshekonombank has reached 2 percent of Russia's total bank loans (Vneshekonombank, 2010, p.11 Sources: For Russia own calculations based on bank data; for other countries Raiffeisenbank (2006; .
The difference between Russia and Central and Eastern European economies may be the direction of transition and not merely its pace. The majority of European transition countries moved away from government banking towards a system driven by private, predominantly foreign, capital. Russian banking system apparently evolves in a quite different direction. The sheer size of public sector in banking (54 percent Bank of India). True privatization of leading financial institutions has been carefully avoided. Industrial policy consists in growing 'national champions' within the public sector, modernizing them to the extent possible and supporting their expansion including overseas. China pursues much the same policy.
Upward trend in the market share of state-controlled banks began in 1999, i.e. years before the financial crisis of 2008-9. Public sector expansion was driven by a combination of organic growth and takeovers of private banks. According to our calculation, from 1Q2000 through 1Q2011 state-controlled banks have been growing by 62 percent a year (assets in nominal terms in national currency, not-weighted average), whereas all other Russian banks grew by 29 percent a year. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 public banks strengthened their market position due to liquidity support and equity contributions from the government, whereas other groups of market participants (foreign-controlled banks and private national banks) saw their balance sheets shrink more significantly. Fig.4 depicts crowding out of domestic private sector by public sector and, to a lesser extent, foreign bank subsidiaries. In 2010 the expansion of the public sector came to a halt and was partly reversed as a product of private sector recovery, state withdrawal from several non-core institutions, and asset-stripping at state-controlled banks (more detail in Section 4). 
Direct vs. Indirect Government Ownership and Control
While direct government ownership offers a bank a more solid and secure market position, it implies costs. Direct reporting to the government enables interference by civil servants and politicians pursuing non-economic goals with disregard to corporate interests of the bank. Banks directly owned by the state are bound by general public sector rules and regulations that may be time-consuming and cumbersome. Core state-owned banks have to perform peculiar policy functions on behalf of the government and central bank (e.g., allocating liquidity among banks in the lower tier; acquiring and holding on the balance sheet non-core industrial assets; making long-term investment available to 'systemically-important' enterprises and 'strategic projects', including sport and con-gress facilities; providing first-aid funds to companies and regions hit by natural or technological disasters).
Since the start of observations (January 2001) we see within the public sector a gradually increasing share of banks indirectly controlled by the state via state-owned entities and 'state corporations'. That share now stands at roughly one-fourth (Fig.5 ).
Figure 5:
Restructuring within the public sector of banking (percent of total assets of statecontrolled banks, year end) There might be a variety of reasons why an owner would build a corporate pyramid. From the perspective of the government, choice of indirect, instead of direct, control may stem from inability to efficiently manage and control a big number of banks by traditional methods of state governance. Other relatively benign motivations are to overcome property right and financing constraints and bureaucratic hurdles, decentralize de-
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IWH Discussion Paper 13/2011 13 cision rights while preserving control, gain in terms of flexibility of management, governance and efficiency. Indirect public ownership opens preferential access to public funds while allowing a higher degree of immunity from government interference (Fan, Wong, Zhang, 2005; Okhmatovskiy, 2009 ). The degree of political interference in such banks is lower, allowing them to take business decisions fast and to pursue essentially profit-oriented policies. Looking at data for 2001 -2003 , Okhmatovskiy (2009 found that in terms of profitability proxied by return on assets the banks with ties to stateowned enterprises had an advantage over banks directly controlled by the government.
On the other hand, corporate pyramids separate control from ownership. Gazprombank, Russia's 3 rd largest bank initially was under direct control of OAO Gazprom. Now the stake of Gazprom fell to 41.73 percent, and Gazprombank's majority shareholder of record is Gazfond, the Gazprom's pension fund run by Lider company influenced by private shareholders of Bank Rossiya. Likewise, Moscow city government used to control fully Bank Moskvy, Russia's 5 th largest financial institution, from its inception in 1995, but after a chain of seemingly innocent corporate actions direct control slipped away from the government, leaving the city of Moscow with just 48.11% percent of equity.
Each additional tier of a corporate pyramid weakens public control and scrutiny over the use of public funds. In addition, indirectly state-owned banks sometimes recur to circular structures of corporate ownership and control. 6.98 percent of Gazprombank shares belong to "OOO ovfintekh", Gazprombank's subsidiary company. Bank Moskvy and Stolichnaya strakhovaya gruppa own each other's shares. Mutual ownership of shares is usually employed as a defense instrument against corporate raiders, but its usage in the public sector might seem unnatural. It probably reflects the intention of bank insiders to entrench against outside shareholders or to prepare ground for appropriation of assets.
Indirect state ownership is preferred by influential insiders of respective banks because it reduces their accountability and allows running those banks like their private property. Indirect ownership often leads to dilution of majority stakes, tacit appropriation of bank equity and other examples of opportunistic behavior by managers. Bank Moskvy is a clear illustration of corporate governance failure resulting from loss of direct control over a state-owned bank's activities. The previous mayor of the City of Moscow entrusted the bank to its then CEO who found himself beyond any control. The CEO became an important minority shareholder of the bank controlling up to 25 percent of equity directly and otherwise. In 2011 new top-managers of Bank Moskvy discovered that previous management team had lent over RUB 200 bn to related companies. The combined value of such loans exceeded 150 percent of the bank's equity (while according to international standards anything exceeding 25 percent is deemed imprudent). Recovery of those loans is highly questionable. In total the rehabilitation of Bank Moskvy may require RUB 295 bn of public funds coming from the CBR via the deposit insurance agency (Kommersant, 05.07.2011 Some authors argue that form of ownership is irrelevant to performance and what matters is quality of legal system, management, corporate governance etc. However, empirical studies using form of ownership as explanatory variable find that financial performance and market behavior of state-controlled banks differ from those of private as well as foreign-controlled banks. The sign of the difference is unclear, though. Karas et al. (2010) found that in Russia domestic public banks are no less efficient than private ones. That surprising prediction was later validated by banking statistics: by 2010 state-controlled banks (in Central Bank of Russia definition) were ahead all other groups of domestic banks in terms of profitability (Table 3) . Table 4 offers descriptive statistics for our sample of state-controlled banks. While state-controlled banks tend to be much larger than other Russian banks, their operational characteristics, and especially the cost-income ratio, are not necessarily better. Fungáčová, Solanko and Weill (2010) found no greater market power for Russian statecontrolled banks over 2001-7. The finding of presumably lower market power of public banks stems from another empirical result, namely that state-owned banks operate with a narrower interest margin. Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2009) analyze interest margin determinants with a particular emphasis on the bank ownership structure and argue that state-controlled banks do not seem to take credit risk into account in their pricing strategy. By contrast, Anzoátegui, Martínez Pería and Melecky (2010) argue that the top 20 Russian banks and state-owned banks seem to be able to exert more market power than the smaller banks and privately-owned institutions.
IWH Discussion Paper 13/2011 15 One important feature is execution of social, geopolitical or whatever other noneconomic tasks by state-owned banks on behalf of the government. Currently the government is responsible for more than two-thirds of all investment in industry and infrastructure (Lebedev, Sivakov, 2011) and most of that investment is channeled through state-controlled banks. The government's core banks (Sberbank, VTB, Rosselkhozbank and -to a lesser extent -Gazprombank) are pushed to develop policy lending and build a portfolio of policy-motivated assets (loans, equities and industrial assets) unusual for commercial banks.
An alternative explanation to seemingly higher profitability of state-owned banks is that financial data reported by them is less reliable than those reported by private and especially foreign-owned banks. Until 2011 financial statements of Bank Moskvy did not disclose the magnitude of lending to related companies, so inadequately low level of provisioning allowed the bank to report substantial 'profits' instead of a huge gap in the balance sheet. Strangely, external auditors overlooked that. This episode casts serious doubt on the quality of financial reporting at other large state-owned banks.
Whereas lending and pricing decisions of state-owned banks can deviate from economic rationality, lending on behalf of the government does not necessarily imply inferior revenue performance of public banks compared to private peers. A substantial share of profits earned by state-controlled banks may in essence represent rent coming from oligopoly position, fulfillment of public procurement, state backing, administrativelyimposed preferences, etc. Profitability is thus an improper indicator of relative performance in an economy with a blurred borderline between commercial banking and development banking and absence of a level playing field for all players. We think that if players with the largest market shares are basically non-market-type entities who by de-
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IWH Discussion Paper 13/2011 16 finition cannot go bankrupt thanks to soft budget constraint, then standard methodology of empirical industrial organization might be less relevant for modeling bank behavior.
One more possible explanation to lower average interest rates charged by public banks may be related to corruption. Sub-market lending rates can be partly offset by kickbacks paid by private borrowers to managers of state-owned banks, thus maintaining the total cost of borrowing at market-average.
The State Engagement/Disengagement Cycle
Since 1980s, state participation in the banking industry has followed a cycle of disengagement and re-engagement. After several decades of state monopoly on banking, a big-time state withdrawal started in the early-1990s. Unlike in CEE countries, in Russia banks were not subject to an organized privatization. Schoors (2002) (Schoors, 2002) . A large proportion of former state banks did not survive financial turmoil of 1995, 1998-99, 2004 and 2008-09 due to mismanagement, incompetence, fraud, asset stripping etc.
After the 1998 financial crisis the government started a gradual but consistent reengagement with the banking industry. As shown in Section 2, the number of statecontrolled banks and their combined market share grew continuously for more than decade, and particularly in 2008-9. Unlike in some mature market economies, the de facto re-nationalization of banks in Russia did not envisage a clear exit strategy. In pursuit of a second 'national champion' position (after Sberbank) VTB bank gradually takes over and consolidates two other state-controlled banks, Bank Moskvy and Transkreditbank. Control over Transkreditbank will thus pass from one public sector entity (OAO RZhD -Russian Railways) to another (VTB), preserving indirect public ownership and control over the bank (Fig.6 ). As far as Bank Moskvy is concerned, its planned consolidation into VTB group will actually complicate ownership structure: direct public control of the government of the city of Moscow will be replaced by indirect ownership of federal authorities via VTB bank (Fig.7) . access to public funds but they rarely perform socially important functions on behalf of the government. Whereas indirect public ownership might have certain advantages in flexibility and efficiency, it deteriorates agency problem in the public sector. Corporate pyramids in the public sector may signal entrenchment of insiders against external investors and the state itself. Banks in this category are prone to opportunism of topmanagers and other influential insiders.
Policy lending on behalf of the government does not necessarily lead to poor profitability. Empirical research suggests that Russian state-controlled banks display efficiency comparable to domestic private banks. Our interpretation of this challenging finding is that in an environment where state-controlled banks dominate most product markets and enjoy non-competitive advantages, the nature of their earnings is rent rather than normal profit.
The context for a new wave of 'privatization' is rather similar to the situation in 1990s, only the assets involved are now much better capitalized, mostly by the state itself. Its results may be quite similar. In some cases we rather see entrenchment of the current blockholders than privatization proper. Direct government ownership is replaced by indirect ownership, or is transferred to affiliated parties and public sector institutions.
Like it or not, prevalence of state-controlled banks in Russia might be a sustainable long-term trend consistent with government policies of directed allocation of financial resources to politically important sectors and enterprises. Government banking fits best a state-controlled economy 9 .
